European integration

European solidarity

The long-term viability of European integration relies on a sense that member states and publics share important connections. Whether framed in terms of a European identity, the idea of linked fates, or more prosaically economic interdependence, a feeling that states and publics are connected is essential. Where does such a feeling come from? Does it make sense to think of it as transnational solidarity? Is it stronger in some countries than in others? And how do the European Union’s limits affect who the connectedness extends to?

Illustration: Fabien Vienne ‘Cooperation Intereuropeenne’

Fifty Years of Public (Dis)Satisfaction with European Governance

Since its beginnings in the 1950s, the policymaking scope and authority of the European Union have dramatically expanded across a wide range of issue areas. Yet much remains unknown about the interaction between public preferences for EU-level governance, changes in such governance and overall support for European integration. This article analyses surveys ranging from 1962 to 2010 to show that while support for integration in different policy areas has fluctuated over time, it has been surprisingly stable overall; moreover, the relative preference ordering across issue areas has been even more consistent. In addition, this consistency is not affected by changes in Europeanization, nor do such changes appear to be driven by the relative strength of preferences. Finally, issue-specific support for EU-level governance has an impact on overall EU support that becomes stronger as Europeanization in that issue area increases, an effect that increases further with greater political knowledge. These findings call into question understandings of rising Euroscepticism as a reaction to Europeanization taking place primarily in areas where publics oppose it. In addition, they indicate that public awareness of European integration is far greater than political knowledge tests appear to indicate.

Enlargement and the anticipatory deepening of European integration.

Since its beginnings in the 1950s, the policymaking scope and authority of the European Union have dramatically expanded across a wide range of issue areas. Yet much remains unknown about the interaction between public preferences for EU-level governance, changes in such governance and overall support for European integration. This article analyses surveys ranging from 1962 to 2010 to show that while support for integration in different policy areas has fluctuated over time, it has been surprisingly stable overall; moreover, the relative preference ordering across issue areas has been even more consistent. In addition, this consistency is not affected by changes in Europeanization, nor do such changes appear to be driven by the relative strength of preferences. Finally, issue-specific support for EU-level governance has an impact on overall EU support that becomes stronger as Europeanization in that issue area increases, an effect that increases further with greater political knowledge. These findings call into question understandings of rising Euroscepticism as a reaction to Europeanization taking place primarily in areas where publics oppose it. In addition, they indicate that public awareness of European integration is far greater than political knowledge tests appear to indicate.